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a b s t r a c t 
We study the impact of a supply management mechanism (SMM) similar to the Market 
Stability Reserve proposed in 2015 which preserve the overall emissions cap and we com- 
ment on the recent cap-changing amendments. We provide an analytical description of 
the conditions under which an SMM alters the emissions abatement paths, affecting the 
expected length of the banking period and its variability. While abatement strategies of 
risk neutral ﬁrms solely depend on the former, for risk-averse ﬁrms changes in the latter 
would lead to higher risk premia, accelerated depletion of the bank and, consequently, fur- 
ther reduction of abatement and allowance prices. Cancellation of part of the reserve could 
partially outweigh the effect on risk premia sustaining allowance prices. 
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite an emerging use of supply control mechanisms, in most existing cap-and-trade programmes the environmen- 
tal reduction target (the cap) is ﬁxed and the supply of allowances is inﬂexible and determined within a rigid allocation 
programme. In theory, as long as the regulator makes allowances available before they are needed, the programme will 
deliver a cost-effective solution Hasegawa and Salant (2015) . However, observations from recent cap-and-trade schemes –
in particular the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) – have raised concerns over excessive allowance price 
variability and price collapse. These maladies seem to stem from a problem of ‘over-supply’, wherein unexpectedly low lev- 
els of allowance demand have led to the accumulation of a signiﬁcant surplus of allowances. An article in The Economist 
(2013) lamented a surplus of allowances equivalent to an average year’s emissions. This surplus is often attributed to two 
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effects. On the one hand, the economic recession and renewables-promoting policies have led to a signiﬁcant drop in al- 
lowance demand; on the other, the system has been unable to respond to changes in economic circumstances and policies, 
see Grosjean et al. (2014) and Ellerman et al. (2015) . The resultant drop in allowance prices has policy makers and other 
stakeholders concerned that the current imbalance in supply and demand, if left unchecked, could reduce incentives for 
low-carbon investment and ultimately impair the ability of the EU ETS to meet its targets. 1 
There are already provisions within a cap-and-trade framework that, in theory, should compensate for unforeseen 
changes in allowance demand. For example, most ETSs have banking provisions that should provide ﬁrms with a tool to 
respond to demand shocks. Several studies have explored the effect of banking and borrowing provisions as cost ‘smooth- 
ing’ mechanisms which decrease allowance price variability; Hasegawa and Salant (2014) provide a comprehensive and crit- 
ical review of the literature on bankable emissions allowances that has developed over the last two decades. Other studies 
demonstrate how hybrid systems, combinations of quantity- and price-based instruments, lower expected control costs ulti- 
mately mitigating allowance price variability ( Fell and Morgenstern, 2010; Grüll and Taschini, 2011; Fell et al., 2012b; 2012a ). 
However, these provisions alone may not be sufficient when the market is faced with severe demand shocks. This leads to 
the question of how to amend an existing ETS to deal with an unexpected under- or over-supply of allowances. Namely, how 
should the allowance allocation programme (the supply, which can be controlled by regulators) be changed to better cope 
with unexpected changes in allowance demand. In the case of the EU ETS, the European Commission (EC) has proposed a 
structural reform of the ETS, including the implementation of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) that has started to operate 
in 2019 ( EC, 2014a; 2014b; EP, 2015 ). The MSR amends the allowance allocation programme. In particular, it adjusts the 
number of allowances auctioned based on the size of the aggregate bank, i.e. the sum of ﬁrms’ individually held banks of 
allowances. Hereafter, we refer to quantities concerning the entirety of regulated ﬁrms as ‘aggregate’ whereas the respective 
quantities for each ﬁrm are referred to as ‘individual’. In a given year, if the aggregate bank of allowances exceeds 833 
million, a pre-deﬁned percentage of the size of the aggregate bank will be withheld from auctions and will be placed in a 
dedicated reserve. There are two intake rates: 24% from 2019 to 2023 and 12% from 2024. These allowances are returned to 
the market in batches of 100 million as soon as the aggregate bank drops below the threshold of 400 million. In its original 
2015 design, the MSR changes the allowance allocation programme but leaves the total number of allocated allowances (the 
cap) unchanged within the regulatory period. As such, the reserve is temporary in nature and the initially proposed version 
of the MSR preserves the original cap. The alternatives of temporarily versus permanently placing allowances in the reserve 
have been heartily debated in the past years. In late 2017, after numerous stakeholder consultations and more than two 
years of negotiations, the European Commission decided that, starting in 2023 the volume of allowances that can be held in 
the reserve will be capped at the previous year’s auction volume. The resulting difference in the reserve will be cancelled, 
providing a mechanism for allowances to be retired and thus reduce the long-run supply of allowances. 
In an earlier paper ( Kollenberg and Taschini, 2016 ), we examined a similar dynamic allocation programme where the 
cap could be varied in response to exogenous shocks, as is the case for the 2017 version of the MSR. Accordingly, the 
applicability of this earlier framework to the original 2015 MSR is limited. With the additional objective to comment on the 
recent proposed MSR amendments (allowances cancellation), we focus our analysis on a generalised, cap-preserving supply 
management mechanism (SMM for short) similar to the original 2015 MSR legislation. The proposed SMM allows us to 
abstract from the operational details of the EC MSR 2 and to provide a conceptual framework that enable us to transparently 
illustrate (1) how ﬁrms’ abatement strategies vary in response to changes of the allowance allocation programme and (2) 
how an SMM affects the risk-premium associated to holding allowances or any equivalent investment in abatement. As such, 
we draw from and contribute to the literature on inter-temporal permit trading under uncertainty and to the emerging 
literature on the assessment of mechanisms that vary allowance allocation according to market conditions, such as indexed 
regulations (among others, Newell and Pizer, 2008; Kollenberg and Taschini, 2016; Lintunen and Kuusela, 2018 ), output- 
based allocation ( Meunier et al., 2017 ), and price-based mechanisms ( Aldy et al., 2017 ). In particular, the implications of the 
changes in risk-premia speak directly to the policy debate playing out among experts on no-cap adjustments versus cap 
adjustments. Our analysis ultimately suggests that a permanent cancellation of part of the reserve could keep in check the 
premium that risk-averse ﬁrms demand for abatement investments. As a by-product, the relevance of our ﬁndings extends 
to the policy debate in California, South Korea and the member States of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, where 
similar supply management mechanisms were adopted. 
The results of previous theoretical and empirical analyses of intertemporal trading of emission allowances reveal that, 
under the usual assumption that marginal abatement costs are increasing in emissions reduction, ﬁrms start accumu- 
lating allowances and then draw them down, see Rubin (1996) , Schennach (20 0 0) , Ellerman and Montero (20 07) , and 
Ellerman et al. (2015) . Banking of allowances is thus a manifestation of the inter-temporal trading problem. The ratio- 
nale for banking is quite intuitive: if tomorrow’s discounted expected cost is higher than today’s cost, it is worth bank- 
ing allowances, whether obtained by abating more emissions today or by purchase, and either using them to cover some 
of tomorrow’s emissions or selling them later on. The expected duration of the banking period, i.e. the period of time 
during which ﬁrms prefer to hold allowances, depends on the amount of abatement implied by the cap and, as long 
1 In a 2015 official note, the European Parliament states that the surplus prevents “the EU ETS from delivering the necessary investment signal to reduce 
CO 2 emissions in a cost-efficient manner and from being a driver of low-carbon innovation...” [EC, 6th October 2015]. 
2 We discuss the implications of this modelling choice in Section 2.3 . 
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as the original abatement path is feasible (see Perino and Willner, 2016 ), it is independent of the allowance allocation 
programme. 
A banking model with no uncertainty and perfect competition would predict that during the banking period [0, τ ) the 
price P t of allowances will rise at the risk-free rate r , d P t /P t = rd t, where τ identiﬁes the ﬁrst instance when the aggregate 
bank is completely depleted and t represents time. In practice, however, ﬁrms cannot perfectly predict the number of al- 
lowances they will require in the future and, consequently, the market equilibrium price of allowances becomes subject to 
uncertainty. Holding allowances and investments in abatement are no longer risk-free. The evolution of the allowance price 
during the banking period is now governed by the no-arbitrage condition E [ dP t ] /P t = μt dt, where μt includes the possibly 
time-dependent risk premium ( Ellerman and Montero, 2007 ). In effect, allowance prices and, accordingly, the required re- 
turn on abatement investments will respond to changes in ﬁrms’ expectation about future allowance demand and supply 
during the banking period, the length of which depends in turn on these expectations. 
In the analysis that follows, we explore the impact of an SMM on ﬁrms’ abatement strategies using a model of the inter- 
temporal pollution control and allowance trading. We consider the inter-temporal optimisation problem of each entity in a 
continuum of small regulated ﬁrms. At each point in time, each ﬁrm has to decide by how much she wants to offset her 
individual emissions, considering current and future costs of reducing emissions, as well as her existing individual bank of 
allowances and future allowance demand and allocations. The chief decision state variable is the ﬁrm’s expected required 
individual abatement, the difference between counterfactual emissions (individual cumulative emissions in the absence of 
emissions restrictions) and the number of allowances individually allocated. Every ﬁrm adjusts her abatement and trading 
strategies at each time t based upon this state variable, taking into account her current bank of allowances and any change 
in the required abatement. Under uncertainty, changes in ﬁrm’s expectation about the required individual abatement affect 
how much individual abatement and banking will occur in the future – and for how long. We thus frame our analysis of the 
impact of a cap-preserving mechanism that amends the allowance allocation programme, similar to the 2015 version of the 
MSR, in terms of two main state variables: ﬁrms’ expectations about the required abatement and the length of the banking 
period. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that ﬁrms’ strategy adjustments and the overall efficacy of the 2015 MSR are highly 
dependent on the constraints on temporal provisions (i.e. limitations on borrowing) and on the design of the mechanism 
implemented to adjust the allowance allocation, see Salant (2016) , Perino and Willner (2016) , Fell (2016) . In the absence of 
borrowing constraints, abatement decisions are independent of the temporal distribution of allowances. If ﬁrms can always 
borrow from future allocations, any change to the allocation programme that maintains the overall emissions cap is irrele- 
vant. Firms will simply borrow the required allowances needed to remain on their original cost-minimised emissions path 
and the adjustments of the allowance allocation programme will have no inﬂuence. Under borrowing constraints, a change 
in the allocation programme can affect abatement and allowance price paths only when the amount of allowances presently 
available to ﬁrms to cover emissions is insufficient. This is the availability condition in Salant (2016) or the feasibility con- 
dition in Perino and Willner (2016) . 
Our analytical results are consistent with these results: an SMM can only change abatement and allowance price paths 
if and only if the onset of the SMM changes the expected required abatement, i.e. the expected future net demand of al- 
lowances. Speciﬁcally, abatement strategies are unaltered when neither the expectation about the length of the banking 
period ( τ ) nor the post-SMM expected required abatement change. Conversely, when the adjustments in the allowance al- 
location programme determined by an SMM affect the expected required abatement, the expected length of the banking 
period τ and its distribution vary. 3 When considering the impact of previously unexpected changes (e.g. demand shocks), 
we note that changes to the timing of allowance allocation can affect the instantaneous likelihood of the event of an in- 
stantaneous depletion of the bank. We term this instantaneous breakdown . That is to say, changes to the distribution of τ by 
an SMM can change the probability that ﬁrms are not able to compensate for a demand shock with their current individual 
bank of allowances. This is related to the discussion of price variability in Perino and Willner’s analysis. They show that the 
short-term scarcity produced by the (binding) MSR can drive prices up and increase price volatility when allowances are 
removed from the market. Our ﬁndings support the conclusion that a cap-preserving supply control mechanism increases 
price variability overall. 
Crucially, changes in price volatility due to an SMM are immaterial for risk neutral ﬁrms. Their abatement strategies 
solely depend on the expected required abatement. However, for risk-averse ﬁrms, differences in price volatility matter and 
should be reﬂected in the risk premium demanded by those ﬁrms for holding allowances or for investing in abatement. 
Thus, we expand our analysis to risk-averse ﬁrms and show that changes in the probabilistic distribution of τ brought on 
by an SMM that lead to higher price variability (compared to no-SMM) generate higher risk premia. The higher the risk 
premium, the more quickly ﬁrms will deplete their bank, which leads to lower levels of abatement and lower prices. How- 
ever, abatement and allowance prices are affected to a lower extent during different periods of the bank. Thus, compared to 
the no-SMM case, the consequence of higher price variability are more compelling when regulated ﬁrms are not perfectly 
risk-neutral. This could have signiﬁcant implications for the overall impact of an SMM like the MSR proposed in 2015. While 
one of the goals some stakeholders attributed to the original MSR was to increase prices during periods of over-supply, the 
building up of the allowance reserve by a cap-preserving mechanism would have the opposite effect. When the behaviour 
3 We use the term distribution in the sense of a distribution of variables that are subject to uncertainty. 
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of risk-averse ﬁrms is taken into account, the impact of an SMM is more striking: the rise in price volatility would lead 
to higher risk premia, accelerated depletion of the bank and, consequently, abatement and prices are reduced even further. 
Cancellation of part of the reserve could partially outweigh the effect on risk premia and sustain allowance prices. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Sections 2.0 and 2.1 we describe the model assumptions and 
deﬁne the key decision making variables for each of the agents on the allowance market. In Section 2.2 we present the 
market equilibrium in terms of aggregate quantities and provide an analytical description of the conditions under which an 
SMM alters the emissions abatement paths. In Section 2.3 we relax the assumption of risk neutrality and explore the effect 
of an SMM on a time-dependent risk premium. Section 3 concludes. 
2. The model: firms’ pollution control problem 
Regulated ﬁrms are assumed to be atomistic in a perfectly competitive market for emission allowances. Firms face an 
inter-temporal optimisation problem where, at each point in time, they have to decide how much they want to offset their 
emissions (either by abating or by trading allowances), considering the current and future costs of reducing emissions. Each 
ﬁrm accounts for her current individual bank of allowances and the number of allowances she expects to be allotted in 
the future. In this context, the required abatement , the difference between the cumulated individual amount of emissions 
without abatement requirements (counterfactual individual emissions) and their future allocation, is the key quantity each 
ﬁrm has to assess at each point in time. Under uncertainty, changes in a ﬁrm’s expectation about the required abatement 
affect how much abatement and banking will occur in the future – and for how long. Crucially, the impact of these changes 
is relevant only during the banking period. Once the bank is depleted, the inter-temporal problem breaks down : each ﬁrm 
uses every allowance available to cover contemporaneous individual emissions and instantaneously abates her residual indi- 
vidual emissions ( Schennach, 20 0 0 ). 4 Thus, we focus our analysis on the banking period [0, τ ) and investigate under which 
conditions an SMM can alter the length of the banking period τ and its probabilistic distribution. 
Firm i ’s dynamic cost minimisation problem is 5 
min 
αi ,β i 
E 
[∫ τ
0 
e −rt v i (αi t , β
i 
t ) dt 
]
, (1) 
s.t. B i t = B 
i 
0 + A 
i (0 , t) − E i (0 , t) + 
∫ t 
0 
αi s ds −
∫ t 
0 
β i s ds, 
B i t > 0 , and B 
i 
τ = 0 . 
where r is the risk-free rate; v i denotes the cost function; B i 0 represents the ﬁrm’s initial individual bank of allowances; 
A i (0, t ) represents the sum of allowances allocated to ﬁrm i from time 0 to t ; and E i (0, t ) represents ﬁrm i ’s pre-abatement 
cumulated emissions during the same period. With an SMM the allowance allocation programme changes, thus both indi- 
vidual allocation and emissions may be subject to uncertainty. Finally, let αi t denote instantaneous abatement and β
i 
t be the 
number of allowances sold ( β i t > 0 ) or bought ( β
i 
t < 0 ). Later we will assume a speciﬁc functional form for the cost function 
v ( · ) and provide equilibrium results in closed form. 
2.1. Required abatement under uncertainty 
To capture the impact of uncertainty on banking in a cap-and-trade programme under the SMM, we identify two key 
state variables of the system: the time- t expectations of (i) the instant τ when the aggregate bank is completely depleted 
and (ii) the corresponding required aggregate abatement, that is counterfactual emissions over [0, τ ) minus the total number 
of allowances allocated in the same period (including the initial aggregate bank of allowances). When new information 
becomes available, ﬁrms update their expectations and adjust their strategies. That is, abatement and trading strategies 
are adapted at each time t , taking into account the current aggregate bank of allowances and the change in the required 
aggregate abatement. 
We express the time- t expectation of the instant when the aggregate bank is completely depleted as E t [ τ ] . 6 The ag- 
gregate abatement required over the period [0, τ ) is represented by Y = Y (0 , τ ) ; we refer to its expected value as E t [ Y ] . 
Finally, dE t [ Y ] represents changes in expectations about the required aggregate abatement. These three expressions are key 
to understanding how abatement and allowance prices change when ﬁrms’ expectations change during the banking period. 
4 Schennach (20 0 0) investigates the effect of a permanent costless reduction in SO 2 emissions in a deterministic framework and provides approximate 
solution when the model is solved under uncertainty. In this context, our contribution extends the effort s of Schennach (20 0 0) by deriving an exact 
analytical solution of the market equilibrium under uncertainty. This allows us to derive the equilibrium under risk-aversion, as described in Appendix B . 
5 The instant τ of full depletion of the aggregate bank (in equilibrium) transfers directly to the individual ﬁrm’s optimisation problem in form of the 
constraint B i τ = 0 , since after τ the price increases at a lower rate than the rate of interest. Thus, there is no individual incentive to bank allowances 
beyond τ . 
6 By convention, E t [ ·] = E [ ·|F t ] represents the conditional expectation where F t indicates the information available at time t . We refer to the Appendix 
for an analytical speciﬁcation of F t . 
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2.2. Equilibrium solution for risk-neutral firms 
We now consider the optimisation problem in (1) and characterise the market equilibrium under risk-neutrality. In order 
to have an analytically tractable model, we assume a linear functional form for the marginal abatement cost curve, AC ′ (αi ) = 
t + 2 ̺ αi , where t and ϱ represent the intercept 7 and the slope of the marginal cost curve, respectively. Firms can sell 
and buy allowances | β i t | at a price P t ; they face costs TC ( β
i ) for each trade. 8 
Firm i ’s instantaneous costs of reducing emissions via abatement and trading are thus given by 
v 
i 
t (α
i 
t , β
i 
t ) = t α
i 
t + ̺  · (α
i 
t ) 
2 + T C(β i t ) . 
In Appendix A we solve the optimisation problem in (1) and obtain the market equilibrium as a triple ({ αi , β i } i ∈ I , P, τ ), 
where P = (P t ) 0 ≤t≤τ is the equilibrium price process and τ denotes the length of the banking period in equilibrium. In what 
follows, we present the relevant analytical results in aggregate terms. 
In equilibrium, the aggregate abatement at time t is given by 
αt = r e 
rt E 0 [ Y ] 
e rτ (0) − 1 
+ r e rt 
∫ t 
0 
dE s [ Y ] 
e rτ (s ) − e rs 
, (2) 
where for legibility we replace E t [ τ ] with τ ( t ) and E t [ Y ] = E t [ Y (τ )] . 
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Eq. (2) is the expected abatement given the information available at time 0 (we 
compute this below). The expected required aggregate abatement E 0 [ Y (τ )] is spread over the banking period and increases 
at the rate r . At each time t , new information about the future required aggregate abatement becomes available and adjust- 
ments in the equilibrium aggregate abatement may occur. This is represented by the second term on the right hand side of 
Eq. (2) . When the expectation about the future required aggregate abatement changes, the corresponding adjustment dE s [ Y ] 
is spread over the remainder of the banking period. 9 
In the following discussion we investigate the impact of changes in the expected required aggregate abatement and, 
ultimately, how an SMM affects the abatement and allowance price paths. We begin by considering the expected aggregate 
abatement path, computed at time t = 0 which provides a static view of the model results. The time-0 expectations of dE t [ Y ] 
are all zero; hence the second summand of Eq. (2) vanishes when considering the time-0 expectation. 10 Thus, we obtain 
E 0 [ αt ] = re 
rt E 0 [ Y (τ )] 
e rτ − 1 
. (3) 
From this expression we can see that if (1) neither the time-0 expectation of τ (2) nor the time-0 expected required ag- 
gregate abatement E 0 [ Y (τ )] change, the time-0 expected abatement is the same. Basically, the SMM has no effect on aggre- 
gate abatement and allowance prices solely when (post-SMM adjustment) ﬁrms’ expectations about the future net demand 
of allowances do not change. Crucially, the SMM does not change the total number of allocated allowances, but changes the 
timing of the allocation of allowances. The conditions (1) and (2) mentioned above correspond to the no-violation of the 
availability condition in ( Salant, 2016 ) or the feasibility condition in Perino and Willner (2016) . The interpretation of these 
conditions is in line with previous studies on the impact of the 2015 version of the MSR. 
We now consider the impact of previously unexpected changes to the required aggregate abatement and provide a dynamic 
view of our results. We investigate the impact of previously unexpected changes by looking at allowance prices (aggregate 
marginal abatement costs). Eq. (2) immediately yield the equilibrium price process 
P t = t + 2 ̺ αt = t + 2 ̺ re 
rt E 0 [ Y ] 
e rτ (0) − 1 
+ 2 ̺ re rt 
∫ t 
0 
dE s [ Y ] 
e rτ (s ) − e rs 
, 
where price variability is generated by unanticipated changes to the required aggregate abatement dE s [ Y ] . Changes in the 
expected required aggregate abatement dE s [ Y ] change the expected duration of the banking period too. Thus, the joint effect 
of possible changes dE s [ Y ] and τ ( s ) determines the volatility of prices. We will see that this joint effect is in fact subject to 
changes in the programme of the allowance supply, such as the one introduced by the 2015 MSR. Such an effect has been 
explored in terms of a single random shock by Perino and Willner (2016) . They conclude that such a mechanism increases 
price volatility when the shock occurs in the period when the reserve is building up. 
The following analysis extends the efforts of these authors by studying how a cap-preserving supply control mechanism 
affects price volatility and – under risk aversion – the risk premium associated to the instant when ﬁrms prefer to deploy 
7 The intercept t is assumed to increase at the risk-free rate r . 
8 In addition to the cost βP t when buying (negative cost when selling) | β| allowances, ﬁrms might face non-negligible transaction costs per trade. Among 
others, Frino et al. (2010) and Medina et al. (2014) document non-negligible transaction costs in the EU ETS. In our framework, we assume linear marginal 
trading costs, T C ′ (β) = P t − 2 νβ . This ensures uniqueness of the equilibrium and allows us to derive the equilibrium in closed form. In aggregate terms, 
however, the equilibrium results are not affected by the level of ν and prevail for ν = 0 . We thereby consider negligible transaction costs, as is typically 
assumed in the environmental economics literature. Note that the impact of a speciﬁc distribution of ﬁrms’ characteristics across their continuum can be 
studied by the individual strategies provided in our model results. However, this is not the focus of the present paper and is left for future research. 
9 Ellerman and Montero (2007) investigate how the level of reversibility in abatement decisions affect these adjustments (abatement corrections) in 
current abatement. 
10 This is a direct consequence of the tower property of the conditional expectation. 
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Fig. 1. The aggregate bank under risk-neutrality without the SMM (black line) and with the SMM (red dotted line) when the mechanism alters the 
expected banking period. With an SMM, shocks ε that could be absorbed by the bank, may lead to a higher likelihood of an unexpected breakdown. (For 
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
their bank. The rationale is the following: under risk aversion the impact of an SMM on price volatility is reﬂected in the risk 
premium and, consequently, in ﬁrms’ discount rate. The latter signals whether returns from allowance-related investments 
should promise higher or lower returns with consequent effects on allowance banking. 
2.3. Changes in expectations: a dynamic view and risk-aversion 
We now investigate how abatement and allowance prices respond to changes in time- t expectations. Recall that the 
required aggregate abatement Y represents counterfactual aggregate emissions over [0, τ ) minus the total number of al- 
lowances allocated in the same period (including the initial aggregate bank of allowances). Recall also that at τ ﬁrms expect 
future allowance prices to increase at a rate lower than the prevailing market interest rate, so they prefer to use their bank 
to offset their emissions or, equivalently, to borrow allowances. Alternatively, and following the argument in Ellerman and 
Montero (2007) , the full bank deployment occurs when the expected returns on allowances (and equivalently abatement 
investments) is deemed insufficient. The rest of the paper is devoted to the investigation of the impact of an SMM on 
ﬁrms’ expectations and, ultimately, on the evolution of the bank. With an SMM, changes in time- t expectations about the 
required aggregate abatement, dE t [ Y ] , will yield one of two scenarios. First, if the change in expected future net demand 
of allowances is such that allowance prices will continue to grow according to the no-arbitrage condition, then ﬁrms will 
prefer to continue to bank allowances and the time- t aggregate bank remains positive, t < E t [ τ ] . If, however, the change in 
dE t [ Y ] leads to the opposite situation, then ﬁrms will prefer to deploy their bank, t = τ . We term this scenario instanta- 
neous breakdown . Fig. 1 illustrates the case where the change in the expected required aggregate abatement brought on by 
the SMM alters the expected banking period. The aggregate bank with the SMM is weakly below the aggregate bank with- 
out the SMM (red and black line, respectively). Below we explore how an SMM inﬂuences the likelihood of this scenario 
and what conclusions we can draw in terms of policy implications about allowance cancellation. 
We model time- t changes in expectations about the required abatement as dE t [ Y ] = σt 
√ 
(τ − t) z t where z t are indepen- 
dent standard Gaussian shocks and σ 2 t · (τ − t) is the variance of dE t [ Y ] . The term (τ − t) captures a natural assumption: 
uncertainty about cumulated aggregate emissions, i.e. aggregate emissions over [0, t ], diminishes as time goes by and we 
approach τ . The term σ t , on the other hand, represents the variance of unexpected changes to τ , which may be subject to 
the changes to the allocation programme as described further below. 
At its inception, the SMM withholds allowances from auctions and places them in a dedicated allowance reserve – as long 
as the aggregate bank stays above a given upper threshold. Therefore, the level of the aggregate bank of allowances decreases 
when the reserve is building up. The smaller the aggregate bank, the larger the likelihood of an instantaneous breakdown. 
Later, allowances from the reserve are made available, adding to the aggregate bank. We capture these changes to the 
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likelihood of an instantaneous breakdown by modelling σ t as a function of the current aggregate bank, σt = σ (B t ) > 0 , 
where ∂σ
∂B t 
< 0 . In effect, without an SMM, the likelihood of a breakdown would be smaller, in particular when the reserve 
is building up. As such, the SMM increases the risk associated to the expected abatement requirement, especially in the 
short run. 
How do ﬁrms’ abatement strategies change when adjustments in the allowance allocation programme determined by the 
SMM affect the time- t variance of τ? In order to understand the implications of this effect, we consider an extension of 
the modelling framework where changes in the variance of τ are properly reﬂected in ﬁrms’ abatement strategies. Thus, we 
relax the risk neutrality assumption and model risk averse ﬁrms who demand a risk premium against the risks associated to 
holding allowances and equivalent abatement investments. Modelling changes in the risk premium – in response to changes 
in the variance of τ – allow us to deepen our understanding of ﬁrms’ reactions to a cap-preserving mechanism and, later, 
comment on the likely effect of allowances cancellation. With risk-aversion, ﬁrm i ’s dynamic cost minimisation problem is 
min 
αi t ,β
i 
t 
E 
[∫ τ
0 
e −μt ·t v i (αi t , β
i 
t ) dt 
]
, (4) 
where the discount rate μt = r + q t includes the risk-free rate r and a (time-dependent) risk-premium q t . 11 Allowances (and 
related low-carbon investments) are perceived as risky investments and are discounted accordingly at the rate μt . If alterna- 
tive investments promise higher returns (discounted according to their respective riskiness), ﬁrms would prefer to postpone 
abatement and use their bank of allowances to offset emissions. In turn, lower abatement levels will be reﬂected in lower 
prices. Intuitively, a high discount rate due to a positive risk premium q t , or equivalently a risk-adjusted discount rate μt 
substantially higher than r , should yield the following market response: lower level of aggregate abatement and, conse- 
quently, lower aggregate bank and allowance prices. Similarly to the case of an instantaneous regulatory change in the gold 
market modelled by Salant and Henderson (1978) , risk-neutral ﬁrms who face the possibility of an instantaneous break- 
down should require the price of allowances to rise by more than the risk-free rate in order for them to hold allowances 
in the face of the possible losses. Fell (2016) and Ellerman et al. (2015) obtain similar market responses when studying the 
sensitivity analysis of the discount rate used in the cost minimisation problem. 
As described in more detail in Appendix B , we use our equilibrium results to analytically characterise the level of ag- 
gregate abatement under risk-aversion αA t and compare it to abatement under risk-neutrality α
N 
t . We obtain the following 
identities: 
αN t − α
A 
t = 
q t 
2 ̺  
e rτ
N 
− e rt 
r 
e −rt P N t > 0 for t < τ
A (t) (5) 
and 
P N t − P 
A 
t = q t 
e rτ
N 
− e rt 
r 
e −rt P N t > 0 for t < τ
A (t) , 
where τ A ( t ) denotes the expected instant when the aggregate bank is completely depleted under risk-aversion; and P N t and 
P A t denote the allowance price under risk-neutrality and risk-aversion, respectively. As expected, aggregate abatement under 
risk-aversion is strictly smaller than under risk-neutrality for t < τ A and, consequently, the aggregate bank is depleted more 
quickly, τ A < τN . 
We now explore what drives the difference αN t − α
A 
t and examine how the SMM affects abatement under risk-aversion. 
As time goes by and we approach the instant τ A (when the non-borrowing constraint becomes binding, uncertainty about 
the required aggregate abatement is gradually reduced, making holding allowances and abatement investments less risky. 
Equally, as time goes by, the risk-premium q t demanded by risk averse ﬁrms decreases. The risk premium enters linearly in 
the expression of the difference (αN t − α
A 
t ) and is multiplied by the term (e 
rτN − e rt ) . This last term determines the inﬂuence 
of q t on abatement and decreases in time as well. In words, the more time was left until the expected τ (the instant when 
allowance prices increase at a rate lower than μt and ﬁrms prefer to borrow allowances), the larger the potential losses 
associated to abatement investments. Conversely, the closer the expected τ , the smaller the potential losses. The value 
of abatement investments that is at risk hence decreases in time and consequently, the impact of risk-aversion on ﬁrms’ 
strategies diminishes when approaching the expected τ . Since e −rt P t is constant in expectation, the two expected abatement 
paths converge exponentially, when approaching the end of the banking period, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . 
We now turn to the effect of changes to the allowance allocation by the SMM. Fig. 3 illustrates the aggregate bank under 
risk-aversion with and without the SMM (red and blue line, respectively). The solid black line represents the aggregate 
bank without the SMM, when ﬁrms are risk-neutral, q t = 0 . As discussed earlier, the SMM adjusts the allowance allocation 
programme by initially removing allowances from the market and then returning them to the market. Accordingly, we model 
the volatility parameter σ t ( g t ) as a function of the allowance allocation g t at time t . The allocation of allowances decreases 
when an SMM removes allowances and increases when an SMM returns allowances to the market. In line with our previous 
discussion, an increase in g t has a negative effect on volatility, 
∂σt (g t ) 
∂g t 
< 0 . In order to examine how the changes in allowance 
11 There is growing empirical evidence of time-dependent risk premia, see Gagliardini et al. (2016) and references therein. In the ﬁnancial econometric 
literature, moves in risk premia are often ascribed to changes in volatility or risk aversion. 
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Fig. 2. Abatement curves for risk-neutral ( αN ) and risk-averse ﬁrms ( αA ). Total abatement under risk-aversion is smaller over the period [0, τ A ), where 
τ A represents the end of the banking period under risk-aversion. The two abatement curves converge as time goes by and would intersect at time t . This 
event, however, will never be observed since under risk-aversion, the inter-temporal problem breaks down at time t = τ A < τN . 
Fig. 3. The aggregate bank without an SMM under risk-neutrality (black line) and under risk-aversion (blue line); aggregate bank with the SMM under 
risk-aversion (red dotted line). The SMM decreases the aggregate bank in the short run and adds to it in the long run, when the reserve is re-injected. 
As in the risk-neutral case, the overall likelihood of an instantaneous breakdown is increased. However, the effect of risk-aversion on the slope of banking 
(dictated by αA ) decreases over time and hence short-term effects are ampliﬁed compared to long-term effects. (For interpretation of the references to 
colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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allocation of the SMM affect abatement decisions under risk-aversion, we ﬁrst consider the risk-premium q t . As shown in 
Appendix B , the rate of change of q t with respect to g t is: 
∂q t (g t ) 
∂g t 
q t 
= 
∂σt (g t ) 
∂g t 
σt 
(6) 
During the building up of the allowance reserve, the change in allowance allocation increases the likelihood of an in- 
stantaneous breakdown. This is reﬂected in an adjustment of the risk-premium q t . More precisely, Eq. (6) reveals that a 
change in g t generates a change in σ t which equally transfers to a change in q t . Consequently, risk-averse ﬁrms adjust their 
abatement behaviour, as quantiﬁed in Eq. (5) . As previously discussed, the impact of q t on abatement is larger in the short 
term, when the expected end to the banking period lies in the distant future and the SMM is removing allowances from the 
market. Thus, in the short run the potential losses associated to abatement investments due to an instantaneous breakdown 
are high. As time goes by, the expected time τ of complete depletion of the aggregate bank approaches and allowances from 
the reserve are released. As we can see from Eq. (5) , the reduction in q t is determined by the combined effect. Abatement 
and allowance prices increase, but to a lower extent than both were decreased earlier during the building up of the reserve. 
In conclusion, we ﬁnd that under risk aversion, the changes brought on by the SMM to the distribution of the instant 
when ﬁrms prefer to use their entire aggregate bank, lead to higher price variability – compared to the risk-neutral case –
and, consequently, higher risk premia. However, we note that the impact of a change in the likelihood of an instantaneous 
breakdown affects prices and abatement more in the short run than it does in the long run. These ﬁndings corroborate 
concerns about rising price volatility, as raised by Perino and Willner (2016) and Fell (2016) . 
The conceptual framework proposed here makes it possible to readily describe also the impact of various policy changes 
that are particularly relevant to the EU ETS market. Most crucially, the amendment of the MSR that allows the mechanism to 
permanently remove allowances, thus changing the cap. Recall that the modelled cap-preserving supply management mech- 
anism ﬁrst places allowances in the reserve and later returns them all to the market. 12 Intuitively, a permanent reduction in 
the cap corresponds to a permanent positive shock to the expected required aggregate abatement. Keeping counterfactual 
emissions ﬁxed, this would result in a downward shift in E t [ Y ] , higher abatement and higher (future) prices, ultimately 
reducing the risk premium required for holding allowances or investing in abatement. 
3. Conclusions 
The supply of allowances in the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has been inﬂexible and determined 
within a rigid allocation programme. As such, the system lacked provisions to address severe imbalances in demand and 
supply of allowances resulting from economic shocks. In 2015 the European Commission proposed a structural reform of 
the EU ETS, including the implementation of a Market Stability Reserve (MSR), operative since 2019. The MSR will adjust 
the allowance allocation programme based on the aggregate bank of allowances: In times of a large bank, allowances are 
transferred to a dedicated reserve to be released in times of scarcity. In its original 2015 design, the MSR preserves the total 
number of allowances issued over the regulatory phase. After two years of negotiations and an extensive impact assessment, 
the European Commission decided that allowances held in the reserve above the previous year’s auction volume will no 
longer be valid. The ﬁndings of our work support the decision for regular cancellation of excess allowances. 
We develop a stochastic equilibrium model of inter-temporal trading of emission allowances to investigate under which 
conditions a supply management mechanism (SMM) similar to that proposed for the EU ETS can alter allowance price and 
emissions abatement paths. Similar mechanisms were adopted in California and South Korea. We show that the timing of 
allocation is largely irrelevant as long as changes in expected net demand of allowances are such that the resulting bank re- 
mains essentially unaltered. Conversely, when the transitory scarcity brought on by the SMM changes the net allowance de- 
mand, the mechanism affects the expected abatement and the price paths. In this context, we consider unexpected changes 
in ﬁrms’ expectations that triggers an instantaneous depletion of the bank of allowances (what we termed unexpected 
breakdown). 
Risk neutral ﬁrms are indifferent to changes in the variability of this event. However, when ﬁrms account for the risk 
in the change of the variability of their future required abatement – i.e. counterfactual emissions minus total number of 
allowances allocated over the same period – and equivalently, risk in the variability of the value of their abatement invest- 
ments, adjustments in the allowance allocation programme matter. We then expand our analysis to study how risk-averse 
ﬁrms’ strategies are affected by an SMM at different points in time of the banking period. We show that changes in the 
distribution of the time of the unexpected breakdown brought on by the SMM lead to higher price variability and, conse- 
quently, higher risk premia. The higher the risk premium associated with holding allowances, the more quickly ﬁrms will 
deplete their bank, which is associated with lower levels of abatement and, importantly, lower allowance prices. 
This has clear policy implications for the current debate on cap adjustments vs. no-cap adjustments: the inﬂuence of a 
generalized, cap-preserving supply management mechanism like the 2015 version of the MSR could be counter-productive, 
12 In practice, under the original 2015 MSR it was possible that the rate at which allowances from the reserve were released was insufficient to cover 
present emissions. Under this scenario, some allowances might be in the reserve at τ . This possibility means that the modelled SMM is not allowance- 
preserving as the mechanism modelled in Perino and Willner (2016) . 
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especially when the behaviour of risk-averse ﬁrms is considered. Importantly, while increased price variability in the short 
run may prevail even under the amended MSR, (the anticipation of) a permanent cancellation of part of the reserve will, at 
the very least, lead to lower risk of low-carbon investments (such as purchase of allowances) and, accordingly, higher prices 
in the short run with lower but less risky long-run returns. The late 2018 increase in allowances prices to almost three 
times its value since the amendment of the MSR may well be attributed to a market perception of such decreased risk. 
Appendix 
In the following sections, we provide the derivations of the key results. 
Appendix A. The model under risk-neutrality 
We consider an inter-temporal optimisation problem where, at each point in time, every ﬁrm has to decide how much 
she wants to offset her emissions (either by abating or by trading allowances), considering the current and future costs of 
reducing emissions. We model the banking period [0, τ ) of a secondary emissions allowances market in a partial equilibrium 
framework under perfect competition. Firms are assumed to be atomistic, that is, ﬁrm i ∈ I individual quantities x i are con- 
tinuously distributed under a measure m x such that aggregate quantities can be obtained by integration, x = x I = 
∫ 
I x 
i dm x (i ) . 
Each ﬁrm continuously minimises expected individual abatement and trading costs at each point in time t ∈ [0, τ i ), where 
τ i denotes the ﬁrst instance when the individual bank B i is completely depleted, 
τ i = min { t ≥ 0 , B i t = 0 } 
and her instantaneous cost function is given by 
v 
i (αi t , β
i 
t ) = t α
i 
t + ̺  · (α
i 
t ) 
2 − P t β
i 
t + ν · (β
i 
t ) 
2 . 
That is, each ﬁrm has the same marginal abatement cost curve t + 2 ̺ αi t , where we assume that the intercept t increases 
by the risk-free rate r and ϱ>0 is constant. Firms face non-negligible transaction costs per trade. More speciﬁcally, we 
assume marginal trading costs to be linear in the number of allowances sold ( β i t > 0 ) or bought ( β
i 
t < 0 ). The parameter ν
represents the magnitude of transaction costs and P t denotes the time- t allowance price. We deﬁne τ = τ I as the ﬁrst time 
when the aggregate bank of allowances is completely depleted, 
τ = min { t ≥ 0 , B = B I = 0 } . 
By deﬁnition of τ , there is no incentive for the aggregate market in equilibrium to hold allowances beyond the end of the 
banking period. Therefore, at time t > τ the incentive to hold allowances vanishes and and allowance prices increase at a 
rate less than the risk-free rate. Since ﬁrms are atomistic and face the same marginal abatement cost function, it is always 
suboptimal for each individual ﬁrm to hold allowances beyond the time τ . We represent this by the requirement 
τ i = τ, i.e. B i τ = 0 . 
For convenience, we write ̟ i t = E t [ Y 
i (t, τ )] , where Y i ( t, τ ) is the time- t residual offsetting requirement: 
Y i (t, τ ) = Y i (0 , τ ) −
∫ t 
0 
αi s ds + 
∫ t 
0 
β i s ds. 
We note that 
dE t [ Y 
i (t, τ )] = (β i t − α
i 
t ) dt + dE t [ Y 
i (0 , τ )] . 
Furthermore, for t = τ we have 
B i τ = −Y 
i (τ, τ ) . 
Hence, we can replace the requirement B τ = B τ i = 0 with the constraint Y 
i 
τ = 0 . 
The equilibrium consists of abatement- and trading strategies αi t and β
i 
t for each ﬁrm i , the market clearing price process 
P t and the equilibrium length (duration) τ of the banking period. In equilibrium, individual deviations from the equilibrium 
do not yield expected additional cost savings for any ﬁrm. The market is assumed to be free of arbitrage and complete. 
We can therefore postulate the existence of a martingale measure Q that is equivalent to the real-world measure P . We 
ﬁrst assume that ﬁrms are risk-neutral. Accordingly, all expectations in this section are taken under the measure Q . In 
Appendix B , we transfer our results to risk-averse ﬁrms by deriving the change of measure from Q to P . 
We begin by assuming Markovian strategies α j = α(Z j t ) , β
j = β(Z j t ) for every ﬁrm j ∈ I { i } except for i . These strategies 
are given as functions of each ﬁrm’s individual state processes Z j t , which will be speciﬁed later. We show that it is optimal 
for ﬁrm i to replicate the other ﬁrms’ strategies given below, as a function of her own state process Z i t . For convenience, we 
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deﬁne 
h t = 
re rt 
e rτ (t) − e rt 
, where τ (t) = E t [ τ ] . 
For each ﬁrm j ∈ I { i }, let her abatement and trading strategies be given by 
α j t = 
P t −t 
2(ν + ̺ ) 
+ 
ν
ν + ̺  
h t ̟  
j 
t and β
j 
t = 
P t −t 
2(ν + ̺ ) 
−
̺ 
ν + ̺  
h t ̟  
j 
t . 
The market clearing condition β I = 0 yields 
P t = t + 2 ̺ h t ̟  
I 
t . (7) 
Substituting for the strategies α j t , β
j 
t above, we obtain the dynamics for the process ̟ 
j 
t : 
d̟ j t = (β
j 
t − α
j 
t ) d t + d E t [ Y 
j (0 , τ )] = −
re rt 
e rτ (t) − e rt ̟
 
j 
t d t + d E t [ Y 
j (0 , τ )] . 
Solving the above, we obtain: 
̟ j t = ̟  
j 
0 
e rτ (0) − e rt 
e rτ (0) − 1 
+ (e rτ (t) − e rt ) 
∫ t 
0 
dE t [ Y j (0 , τ )] 
e rτ (s ) − e rs 
. 
Integrating over I yields, together with Eq. (7) that 
P t = t + 2 ̺ h t ̟  
I 
t = t + 2 ̺  
re rt 
e rτ (0) − 1 
̟ I 0 + 2 ̺ re 
rt 
∫ t 
0 
dE t [ Y 
I (0 , τ )] 
e rτ (s ) − e rs 
. 
In particular, we observe that P has the following dynamics 
d P t = rP t d t + 2 ̺ h t d E t [ Y 
I (0 , τ )] . 
Let the random shocks to E t [ Y 
I (0 , τ )] be governed by a driftless diffusion 
dE t [ Y 
I (0 , τ )] = σ I t dW 
Q 
t , 
where σ I t is deterministic and W 
Q 
t is a Brownian motion under the measure Q . 
The process σ i t describes how changes in the expected future net-supply of allowances are distributed across the set 
of ﬁrms I . We abstract from speciﬁc assumptions about the form of σ i t . However, we note that it is reasonable to assume 
different σ i t for different ﬁrms, since pre-abatement emissions levels and allowances allocations can vary depending on the 
individual ﬁrm and the type of industry under consideration. 
We consider changes in pre-abatement individual allowances demand and in the (possibly contingent) supply of al- 
lowances. Their degree of impact on ﬁrms can vary. However, all ﬁrms are subject to systemic shocks. Hence, we consider 
the same Brownian motion W Q t for each i ∈ I , whereas differences in size, technology etc. are captured by the distribution of 
σ i t across I . Accordingly, shocks to E t [ Y 
i (0 , τ )] are represented by 
dE t [ Y 
i (0 , τ )] = σ i t dW 
Q 
t . 
We now consider the problem of optimal pollution control and allowance trading for ﬁrm i . Let p denote an observed 
allowance price and let P t,p denote the price process with time- t value P t,p t = p. Analogously, let 
t,π
t = π . At time t , the 
ﬁrm i has to bear costs v i t given by 
v 
i 
t (α
i 
t , β
i 
t ) = 
t,π
t α
i 
t + ̺  · (α
i 
t ) 
2 − P t,p t β
i 
t + ν · (β
i 
t ) 
2 . 
Firm i ’s problem is to ﬁnd (Markovian) abatement- and trading strategies αi and β i respectively, such that, for all t ∈ [0, τ ) 
the cost function J , given by 
J(t, ̟  i , p, π , αi , β i ) = E 
[∫ τ
t 
e −rs v i s (α
i 
s , β
i 
s ) ds 
]
, 
is minimised by αi , β i for all π > 0, p ≥0, and such that the constraint E t [ ̟  i τ ] = 0 is satisﬁed for all t ∈ [0, τ ). Let 
w (t, ̟  i , p, π ) = inf (αi ,β i ) J(t, ̟  
i , p, π , αi , β i ) denote the value function for ﬁrm i . 
Firm i ’s observes the state process Z i t = (̟ 
i 
t , P t , t ) , where 
d̟ i t = (β
i 
t − α
i 
t ) dt + dE t [ Y 
i (0 , τ )] = (β i t − α
i 
t ) dt + σ
i 
t dW 
Q 
t , 
d P t = rP t d t + 2 ̺ h t d E t [ Y 
I (0 , τ )] = r P t dt + 2 ̺  h t σ
I 
t dW 
Q 
t , 
dt = rt dt. 
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Let the ﬁrm’s ﬁltration (F i t ) t≥0 be generated by the process Z 
i and accordingly, let (F I t ) , generated by Z 
I , denote the 
aggregate ﬁltration. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation associated to the minimisation problem above is given 
by 
0 = D t w + inf 
a,b 
[
L 
(a,b) w + e −rt v i t (a, b) 
]
= D t w + inf 
a,b 
[ 
(b − a ) D ̟  i w + rpD p w + rπD πw + 
1 
2 
tr (′ D 2 z w ) + e 
−rt (πa + ̺ a 2 − pb + νb 2 ) 
] 
= D t w + rpD p w + rπD πw + 
1 
2 
tr (′ D 2 z w ) + inf 
a,b 
[
(b − a ) D ̟  i w + e 
−rt (πa + ̺ a 2 − pb + νb 2 ) 
]
, 
where  is the vector 
 = 
(
σ i t 
2 ̺ h t σ I t 
)
which implies that 
tr (′ D 2 z w ) = (σ
i 
t ) 
2 D 2 ̟ i w + 2 ̺ h t σ
i 
t σ
I 
t D p D ̟  i w + 2 ̺ h t σ
i 
t σ
I 
t D ̟  i D p w + 4 ̺  
2 h 2 t (σ
I 
t ) 
2 D 2 p w. 
We notice that the minimisers a, b in the above equation have to satisfy 
a = 
1 
2 ̺  
(
e rt D ̟  i w − π
)
and b = 
1 
2 ν
(
p − e rt D ̟  i w 
)
. (8) 
Furthermore, we notice that the second-order condition is satisﬁed for all a, b . This yields the following 
Lemma 1. The HJB equation can be rewritten as 
0 = e rt ( D t w + rpD p w + rπD πw ) + 
e rt 
2 
tr (′ D 2 z w ) −
1 
4 ̺  
(
e rt D ̟  i w − π
)2 
−
1 
4 ν
(
p − e rt D ̟  i w 
)2 
. (9) 
In order to enforce the constraint E t [ ̟  
i 
τ ] = 0 for all t , we impose the singular terminal condition 
lim 
tր τ
w (t, ̟  i , p, π ) = 
{
0 : ̟  i = 0 , 
∞ : ̟  i 	 = 0 . 
(10) 
Theorem 1. The HJB Eq. (9) , together with the terminal conditon (10) is solved by 
w (t, ̟  i , p, π ) = 
r ν̺ (̟ i ) 2 
(e rτ − e rt )(ν + ̺ ) 
+ e −rt 
(
π + 
̺(p − π ) 
ν + ̺  
)
̟ i + 
(1 − e r(τ−t) ) p 2 
4 re rt (ν + ̺ ) 
+ 
∫ τ
t 
C s ds 
where 
C s = 
r ν̺ (σ i s ) 
2 
(e rτ − e rs )(ν + ̺ ) 
+ 
2 ̺  2 h s σ i s σ
I 
s e 
−rs 
ν + ̺  
+ 
̺ 2 h 2 s (σ
I 
s ) 
2 (1 − e r(τ−s ) ) 
re rs (ν + ̺ ) 
for t ≤ s < τ . 
The above theorem can be proved by simple differentiation. The veriﬁcation argument for w is straightforward but 
lengthy. Thus, we omit the full proof. We note that standard arguments of veriﬁcation conﬁrm αi , β i as the ﬁrm’s opti- 
mal strategies. Substituting D ̟  i w in Eq. (8) yields 
αi t = 
P t −t 
2(ν + ̺ ) 
+ 
ν
ν + ̺  
h t ̟  
i 
t and β
i 
t = 
P t −t 
2(ν + ̺ ) 
−
̺ 
ν + ̺  
h t ̟  
i 
t . 
This proves the equilibrium strategies αi , β i to be given as above for all i ∈ I . Furthermore, the aggregate abatement is given 
by 
αt = r e 
rt ̟ 
I 
0 
e rτ (0) − 1 
+ r e rt 
∫ t 
0 
dE s [ Y I ] 
e rτ (s ) − e rs 
and, accordingly, the market-clearing price process is given by 
P t = t + 2 ̺  
re rt 
e rτ (0) − 1 
̟ I 0 + 2 ̺ re 
rt 
∫ t 
0 
dE s [ Y I ] 
e rτ (s ) − e rs 
. 
Let ǫI t and g 
I 
t denote time- t aggregate emissions before abatement and aggregate allocations, respectively. At τ , the inter- 
temporal optimisation problem breaks down and thus αI τ = ǫ
I 
τ − g 
I 
τ . Also, by the deﬁnition of τ and the zero-borrowing 
constraint, we have that min t B 
I 
t = B 
I 
τ = 0 , which yields the ﬁrst order condition dB 
I 
t = (g 
I 
t − ǫ
I 
t + α
I 
t ) dt = 0 for t = τ . Both 
conditions coincide and yield 
E t [ α
I 
τ ] = re 
rτ (t) 
(
̟ I 0 
e rτ (0) − 1 
+ 
∫ t 
0 
dE s [ Y I ] 
e rτ (s ) − e rs 
)
= E t [ ǫ
I 
τ − g 
I 
τ ] . 
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This implies that τ ( t ) is given by 
τ (t) = 
1 
r 
(
ln 
(
E t [ ǫ
I 
τ − g 
I 
τ ] 
)
− ln 
(
r 
̟ I 0 
e rτ (0) − 1 
+ r 
∫ t 
0 
dE s [ Y 
I ] 
e rτ (s ) − e rs 
))
. 
In particular, τ (0) is given in terms of the implicit function 
τ (0) = 
1 
r 
ln 
(
E 0 [ ǫ
I 
τ − g 
I 
τ ](e 
rτ (0) − 1) 
r̟ I 0 
)
, 
where ̟ I 0 depends on τ (0). 
Appendix B. The model under risk-aversion 
Recall that 
h t = 
re rt 
e rτ (t) − e rt 
, where τ (t) = E Q t [ τ ] . 
Under risk-aversion, q t represents the (possibly time-dependent) risk-premium and the allowance price is 
dP t = (r + q t ) P t dt + 2 ̺ h t σt dW 
P 
t . 
Recalling that under the risk-neutral measure Q we have 
d P t = rP t d t + 2 ̺ h t σt dW 
Q 
t , 
we obtain the change of measure by requiring 
d W Q t = d W 
P 
t + 
q t 
2 ̺ h t σt 
P t ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
=: ζt 
d t. (11) 
We then obtain the Radon–Nikodým density of Q with respect to P , restricted on F t as 
dQ 
dP 
∣∣∣
F t 
= L t = exp 
(
−
∫ t 
0 
ζs d W 
P 
s −
1 
2 
∫ t 
0 
ζ 2 s d s 
)
, 
since L = (L t ) t≥0 is in fact a martingale. Recall that the expected residual abatement requirement for the aggregate market 
follows the dynamics 
d ̟  t = −αt d t + σt d W 
Q 
t . 
Let αA t denote the aggregate abatement under risk-aversion. By deﬁnition of the aggregate abatement requirement, we obtain 
that 
d ̟  t = −α
A 
t d t + σt d W 
P 
t . 
The two equations above imply 
d W Q t = d W 
P 
t + 
αt − αA t 
σt 
d t. 
Comparing this to Eq. (11) reveals that the following must hold: 
αt − α
A 
t = 
q t 
2 ̺ h t 
P t . (12) 
This shows that aggregate abatement under risk-aversion is strictly smaller than under risk-neutrality, whenever P t > 0 and 
t < E Q t [ τ ] . However, notice that 
αA t → αt for t → E 
Q 
t [ τ ] . 
Furthermore, notice that since P t = t + 2 ̺ αt we can directly relate αt to αA t : 
αA t = αt −
q t 
2 ̺ h t 
( t + 2 ̺ αt ) = 
h t − q t 
h t 
αt −
q t t 
2 ̺ h t 
. 
We now want to examine how the market responds to cap-preserving changes to the allowance allocation programme and 
how this is captured by varying risk premia. First notice that, given the real-world measure P , the risk-neutral measure is 
parameterised by the risk-premium q t . And, conversely, q t becomes an implicit function of Q . Therefore, we can ﬁx Q in 
order to see how q t is affected by the time- t allocation of allowances, denoted by g t . Since the timing of allocation does 
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not affect the equilibrium in Q -expectation, σ t and q t are the only parameter that are then affected by g t . Fixing Q in 
Eq. (11) then yields 
∂ 
∂g t 
E Q 
[
q t 
2 ̺ h t σt 
P t 
]
= 
E Q P t 
2 ̺ h t σt 
∂q t (g t ) 
∂g t 
−
q t E Q P t 
2 ̺ h t σ 2 t 
∂σ (g t ) 
∂g t 
= 0 , 
from which we obtain 
∂q t (g t ) 
∂g t 
q t 
= 
∂σ (g t ) 
∂g t 
σt 
, 
that is, changes to σ through adjustments to the allowance allocation programme are equally reﬂected in changes to the 
risk-premium q t . 
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